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In recent work I have argued that scientific disagreement can be rational even in contexts of shared evidence and comparable expertise. The notion that rival interpretations of a theory or a model can be rational, however, has potentially worrying consequences for how we view scientific knowledge and our reliance on it in societal contexts of education, funding, and public policy. Thus, we might well hope for constraints on rationally permissible disagreement that would preclude such consequences. I explore this hope through an examination of cases of scientific disagreement, with the aim of identifying conditions under which disagreeing parties may be rational without thereby opening the door to a debilitating relativism. Anjan Chakravartty, University of Miami March 15, 2019 Visit the Rotman website for more information on applications, events, project descriptions, and openings. http://www.rotman.uwo.ca Follow The Rotman Institute on Twitter: https://twitter.com/rotmanphilo Like The Rotman Institute on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/rotmanphilosophy Subscribe to our channel: https://www.youtube.com/user/rotmanphilosophy
